tfw it’s not prescriptivism

I think it would be nice to have a term that allowed us to distinguish between politely asking that we preserve existing useful lexical distinctions (such as between terrorism ‘non-state violence against civilians intended to delegitimize the state’ and terms like atrocities or war crimes, between selfie ‘photo self-portrait’ and photo portrait), and full-blown ideologically-driven prescriptivism. I do not have a proposal for what this term ought to be.

A Morris Halle memory

Morris Halle passed away earlier today. Morris was an absolute giant in the field of linguistics. His work in the 1950s and 1960s completely revolutionized phonological theory. He did this, primarily, by rejecting an axiom of the previous century’s work.
The theory of phonology was so utterly transformed by his argument against the principle of biuniqueness that the very concept is rarely even taught in the 21st century.
And this was just one of his earliest scientific contributions.

I could say a lot more about Morris’s work, but instead let me tell a short anecdote. In 2010 or so I happened to be in the Boston area and my advisor kindly arranged for me to meet Morris. After getting coffee we walked to his spare shared office. The only thing of note was a single wall-mounted bookshelf containing three books: Morris’ own Sound Pattern of Russian and Sound Pattern of English—with the dust cover removed so as to exhibit the unique bas-relief cover designed by Morris’s wife, a talented visual artist—and of course, Walker’s rhyming dictionary. For whatever reason, we started to discuss Latin. Working with the legal pad, Morris first showed me a novel analysis of thematic vowels. Ignoring a few irregular (“athematic”) stems, all Latin verb stems have a characteristic final vowel: -ā- in the first conjugation, -ē- in the second, a vowel of varying quality (usually e or i) in the third, and -ī- in the fourth. In the first conjugation and most of the third conjugation, this vowel disappears in the first person singular active indicative verb, which is marked with an suffix. Thus for the second conjugation verb docēre ‘teach’, we have doceō ‘I teach’, with the theme vowel preserved, and similarly for the fourth conjugation. In contrast, for the first conjugation verb amāre ‘love’, we have amō ‘I love’, with the theme vowel omitted, and similarly for the majority of the third conjugation. This much I already knew. To me it was just one of those conjugational quirks one has to memorize when learning Latin but Morris suggested that it was not necessarily so. What if, he argued, the first conjugation -ā- was deleted by a following ? (Certainly that rule is surface-true, except for a handful of Greek loanwords like chaos.) But what about the third conjugation? Morris suggested that he had long believed the underlying form of the third conjugation theme vowel was [+back], something like /ɨ/, and he proceeded to lay out the necessary allophonic rules, and finally a rule which deletes the first of two [+back] segments! I was floored.

I then showed him an analysis I was working on at the time. Once again ignoring a few irregulars, Latin masculines and feminine nouns of the third declension are characterized by a nominative singular suffix -s. When the verb stem is athematic and ends in a /t, d/, this consonant is deleted in the nominative singular (e.g., frons, frontis ‘forehead’). I argued that this rule ought to be extended to also target /r/ so as to account for the so-called “rhotic” stems like honōs, honōris ‘honor’ (e.g., /honōr-s/ → [honōs]). To make this work, one must write the rule so that it bleeds its own application (see here for the full analysis), and as one of several opaque rules. This is something which is possible in the rule-application framework proposed by Morris and colleagues, but which cannot be straightforwardly implemented in more recent theoretical frameworks. I must have hesitated for a moment as I was talking through this, because Morris grabbed my hand and said to me: “Young man, remember always to speak clearly and to never apologize for your rule ordering.” And then he bid me adieu.

When should we call it “terrorism”?

According to White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders, a recent spate of serial bombings targeting prominent African-Americans in Austin, TX, has “no apparent nexus to terrorism at this time”. I want to make a pedantic lexicographic point about the definition of terrorism (and terrorist) regarding this. There is certainly a sense of terrorism which just involves random lethal violence against civilians, and by that definition this absolutely qualifies. But, that is not the definition used by the state (or mass media). Rather, they favor an alternative sense which emphasizes the way in which the violence undermines the authority of the state. This is in fact encoded in the (deeply evil) PATRIOT Act, which defines terrorism as an attempt to “…to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.” Let’s assume, as seems likely though by no means certain, that the bomber(s) are white supremacists targeting African-American communities. You’d be hard-pressed to argue that terrorizing people of color undermines the authority of a deeply racist society and its institutions any more than say, trafficking crack cocaine in African-American communities to support right-wing death squads abroad. Terrorizing people of color is absolutely in line with US domestic and foreign policy, and the language chosen by the White House (and parroted by the media) naturally reflects that.